Everything so far has been code. This chapter is about the people who will ask whether the code exists, and it is the chapter most engineers skip.
Skip it and someone else answers for you, usually badly, usually by writing a policy that bans something useful and permits the thing that actually hurt you.
The good news is that the first seventeen chapters have produced the artifacts a governance process wants. The work here is mostly translation.
| They will ask for | You built it in |
|---|---|
| A risk assessment for the AI system | The trifecta audit, chapter 3 |
| An inventory of components | The tool register, chapter 13 |
| Access control documentation | Capability issuance, chapter 8 |
| Evidence of human oversight | The approval surface, chapter 14 |
| Testing evidence | The injection suite, chapter 15 |
| Audit logging | The four records, chapter 17 |
| Incident response procedure | Chapter 17's three questions |
Seven asks, seven artifacts, all of which exist because they were useful rather than because a form demanded them. That is the right order to build them in and it is worth saying so when someone proposes the reverse.
Before governing your agent, find out how many you have.
The pattern is consistent across organisations: a sanctioned agent that went through review, and an unknown number of others built by teams who found the frameworks easy, connected them to real data, and never told anyone because it did not feel like a project.
Those second agents have no trifecta audit, no gate, standing credentials, and often a tool that reads a shared drive. They are also usually the most privileged, because they were built by people who had the access and skipped the part where somebody asks why.
An inventory is worth more than a policy here. Ask three questions across engineering: which systems call a model API, which of those can take an action rather than produce text, and what credentials those hold. That list is the actual scope of your problem, and it is reliably longer than anyone expects.
Policies that ban unsanctioned agents produce hidden agents. An easy sanctioned path with the gate already wired in produces fewer of them, because the sanctioned path is less work than building it yourself.
For a US company the relevant question is usually whether you serve EU users, because the EU AI Act reaches you if you do.
The timeline moved in 2026 and the movement is worth getting right, since a great deal of published material is now wrong.
Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, the Digital Omnibus on AI, was adopted on 8 July 2026, published in the Official Journal on 24 July and entered into force on 27 July. It amends the AI Act and defers a substantial part of it.
The practical consequence for most readers is narrow. If your agent talks to people, tell them it is an agent. If it makes decisions in a high-risk domain, you have until December 2027 and a genuine compliance project rather than a chapter.
This book gives no legal advice and this section is not it. Take the dates to your counsel and let them tell you which annex you are in.
When procurement asks you to assess an AI vendor, the standard questionnaires ask about model providers, training data and hallucination rates. Those are the wrong questions for an agent.
Six better ones, all of which come from this book:
A vendor who answers these well has read the same evidence you have. A vendor who responds by describing their guardrail model has answered a different question, and chapter 4 explains why that answer is insufficient on its own.
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